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  Abstract  
In this paper, we conduct a cross-country quantitative analysis of the replace-
ment incentives generated by the EU ETS for the power sector in 2008-12. In 
order to do so, the allocation rules of the Member States are applied to concrete 
reference power plants for three different fuel types (lignite, hard coal and gas). 
Based on these calculations, we compare installation-specific replacement in-
centives across the Member States. Our analysis shows that replacement in-
centives vary significantly across Member States and typically deviate from the 
incentives provided in the reference case of full auctioning. Furthermore, the EU 
ETS allocation rules lead to perverse incentives in approximately 30% of the 
possible replacement options. Only 5 MS do not provide any perverse incen-
tives. Finally, we explore the link between replacement incentives and allocation 
types. Based on our findings, we derive policy recommendations for the design 
of emission trading schemes emerging around the world.  
 
Key words: EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS), replacement, adoption, dif-
fusion, power sector, allocation rules 
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1  Introduction 
Climate change is one of the most important challenges facing humankind. In 
order to address this challenge and achieve its Kyoto target, the European Un-
ion launched an Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 which covers 
large greenhouse gas emitting installations in a variety of industrial sectors, 
among them the power sector. While the Directive 2003/87/EC (EU, 2003) sets 
the ground rules of the trading scheme, such as the minimum share of gratis 
allocation, Member States were still given significant leeway when specifying 
the design elements of the EU ETS (Betz et al., 2004, Kruger et al., 2007) in 
their National Allocation Plans (NAPs). These determine both the limit on emis-
sions at a macro level (the cap), and, at a micro level, the rules according to 
which EU allowances (EUA) are allocated to individual installations. The NAPs 
still had to be approved by the European Commission (EU COM) based on the 
criteria specified in Annex III of the ETS Directive and the NAP guidance docu-
ments (EU, 2004, EU, 2005). 
These micro level allocation rules are important for the incentive structure for 
existing and new installations (Harrison and Radov, 2002). They can impact 
investment decisions on different levels, such as the timing, fuel choice and de-
gree of efficiency, and thus may play an important role in steering industry to-
wards low-carbon investments. However, in the first and second trading phases 
of the EU ETS, these allocation rules have often provided distorting incentives 
(Martinez and Neuhoff, 2005, Neuhoff et al., 2006b, Schleich et al., 2009), such 
as those arising from the treatment of closures and new entrants (Spulber, 
1985, Ahman and Holmgren, 2006, Ahman et al., 2007, Ellermann, 2008). Such 
distortions are particularly problematic for the power sector with its capital-
intensive investments in long-lived power plants (Reinaud, 2003).  
Since the power sector is the largest sector in terms of its share of 32% in total 
EU greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC, 2008), these investments will greatly 
influence the future emission reduction potential of the EU. Therefore, a number 
of studies have analyzed the investment effects of the different allocation rules 
on the power sector. Matthes et al. (2005) make a detailed quantitative com-
parison of the investment incentives provided by phase 1 allocation rules across 
six EU MS by applying them to a set of standardized installations in the power 
sector. For phase 2, which runs from 2008-12, Betz et al. (2006) and Schleich 
et al. (2009) provide a cross-country assessment of the incentives for low-
carbon and energy-efficient technologies for all sectors included in the EU ETS, 
but do not quantify the effects of allocation rules. In a more quantitative ap-2  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
proach, Neuhoff et al. (2006a) briefly compare the phase 2 gratis allocations 
resulting for two types of reference power plants across EU MS. However, the 
study of Neuhoff et al. (2006a) does not incorporate changes in allocation rules 
in response to the cap reductions demanded by the EU Commission for almost 
all MS (e. g. EU, 2006). Among these changes were adjustments in the alloca-
tion rules for the power sector. For example, Germany has switched from 
grandfathering to benchmarking for existing plants, Sweden has eliminated 
gratis allocation to existing power plants and Finland has decided upon a strict 
compliance factor for coal-based power generation. These changes can have 
profound effects on the incentives generated by the EU ETS. Finally, none of 
these studies undertakes an in-depth analysis of the replacement incentives 
generated by the allocation rules in the second trading phase of the EU ETS 
(2008-12).  
It is our aim to close this gap by presenting a quantitative analysis of the re-
placement incentives generated by the allocation rules of the EU ETS for the 
power sector in 2008-12 and contrasting these incentives across EU Member 
States. In doing so, we explore whether there is a link between replacement 
incentives and the allocation types, capacity renewal needs or today’s power 
generation mix. Our analysis covers all EU MS (except Malta and Cyprus). It 
quantifies the resulting incentives for three different fuel types (lignite, hard coal 
and gas), applies the power sector’s allocation rules to concrete reference in-
stallations and analyzes installation-specific replacement incentives for the 
same technology as well as across different fossil-fuel-fired technologies. 
Thereby, policy recommendations will be made which may also be relevant for 
emerging trading schemes around the world, such as the US ETS (ACES Act, 
2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
methodological approach and section 3 provides an overview of general alloca-
tion mechanisms and the allocation rules applied in the EU Member States. 
Section 4 describes the results for the replacement incentives generated by the 
EU ETS. The final section 5 summarizes and discusses the findings and draws 
conclusions for the future improvement of the scheme’s design with regard to 
the incentives for guiding the sector onto a low carbon path. Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  3 
2  Methodology 
2.1  Identification of allocation rules 
Information about the national allocation rules is based on the notified NAPs 
(and other publicly available documents) of the EU MS. However, because 
these rules may have been changed after the EU Commission’s ruling on the 
NAPs (EU, 2007), for each EU MS, excerpts featuring the allocation rules were 
sent to representatives of the national authorities in charge of the EU ETS for 
approval, together with a set of remaining questions. If the official country rep-
resentatives did not respond, other national experts, mainly from companies, 
but also from associations, were contacted with the same set of questions.1 
Despite these information requests, in some instances, the lack of transparency 
in some NAPs could not be resolved.2 In order to take this problem of data va-
lidity into account, in Table 2 the column “status” (1 for sure, 3 for unsure) indi-
cates the degree of certainty attached to the allocation rules.3 
2.2 Reference  power  plants 
In order to quantitatively compare the allocation rules of MS, standardized ref-
erence power plants were chosen for the three fuel types of lignite, hard coal 
and natural gas. For these, the following carbon emission factors (in t/TJ) are 
used: lignite 113 t/TJ, coal 94 t/TJ and natural gas 56 t/TJ (IPCC, 2006, Matthes 
et al., 2005). Origin-specific quality differences of the combustibles were not 
taken into account.4  
For each fuel type, a reference plant is specified for existing and for new plants, 
with the plant-specific features taking technological progress into account (see 
values in Table 1).  
                                            
1   Data collection was finalized in November 2008.  
2   An analysis was not feasible for Hungary because of the lack of information in the available 
Hungarian NAP. Therefore the following diagrams and tables do not contain information 
about the Hungarian allocation rules. 
3   The reasons for data uncertainty and corresponding assumptions are listed in Rogge and 
Linden (2008) in Table 38 (Annex) for each MS. 
4   According to IPCC, emission factors vary across fuels: lignite: 90.9 – 115 t/TJ, anthracite: 
94.6 – 101 t/TJ, natural gas: 54.3 – 58.3 t/TJ. 4  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 









[MW] [h/a] [GWh/a] [t/GWh]
Existing plants
Lignite EL 39% 800 6,500 5,200 1,043
Coal EC 42% 600 4,000 2,400 806
Natural gas EG 56% 400 3,000 1,200 360
New plants
Lignite NL 45% 1,000 7,000 7,000 904
Coal NC 48% 600 4,500 2,700 705
Natural gas NG 60% 500 4,000 2,000 336
Source: Fraunhofer ISI (2008b) 
The specific emissions of the power plants are calculated as follows (consider-
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Consequently, the set of power plants produces the specific emissions (in 
t CO2/GWh) presented in Figure 1.  
The existing power plants do not represent the standard of each country within 
the EU-27. However, the focus of this paper is on the comparison and resulting 
quantification of the allocation rules. Therefore, a fixed set of reference power 
plants without country-specific adjustments to the respective standards is used 
in order to highlight the differences in allocation rules across EU MS.  
The main differences in each country's power plant park should occur with re-
gard to the spread in capacities, efficiencies as well as the load factors (LF). In 
most cases, changes in capacity do not provoke any allocation increases or 
subtractions as long as the allocation is related to electricity production and 
emissions, whereas modifications of load factor or efficiency cause consider-
able changes in the results. If, for example, standardized load factors are used 
in the allocation method, changes in the plants' load factor will not affect the 
allocation, but of course the emissions will increase or decrease proportionately. 
Similar effects can be observed if efficiency modifications are made, and the 
country applies benchmarks. Since a Europe-wide harmonization in technical 
standards is taking place, the figures for new plants are more representative. 
But differences should still remain regarding the load factors, because different Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  5 
fuels may be used for base- or peak-load electricity production. Therefore, the 
lack of differentiation must be taken into consideration when evaluating the find-
ings of this study. 
Figure 1:  Emissions of reference power plants 
  
















































Source: Fraunhofer ISI (2008b) 
 
If operators close an old, less efficient plant with higher emissions and 
with a new, more efficient one with lower emissions, overall emissions will be 
reduced. Since in the EU ETS the allocation of allowances is terminated after 
the year of closure, our criterion to evaluate the replacement incentives com-
pares the shortage/surplus (in EUA/GWh) of an existing plant with that of a cor-
responding new one (see Formula 2). This comparison is made for a replace-
ment with the same technology (e.g. old lignite with new lignite) and with a dif-
ferent technology (e.g. old lignite with new gas). The cross-technology compari-
son is important because not all replacements lead to a reduction of specific 
emissions, e. g. replacing an old gas-fired power plant with a new lignite-fired 
one. Consequently, such a replacement should be discouraged. 6  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
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In order to evaluate the replacement (dis)incentives provided by the allocation 
rules of MS, we compare them with those of the reference case. Our reference 
case is given by the change in the EUA balance which would be created in the 
case of full auctioning. These reference values correspond to the specific emis-
sion savings associated with each of the nine possible replacements, as illus-
trated in Figure 2. That is, each replacement leading to emission savings is as-
sociated with a positive reference value, and each replacement leading to an 
emission increase yields a negative reference value, i.e. a disincentive.  
Figure 2:   Specific emission savings due to replacement 
   
Source:   Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a)  





























































































placement criterion and ‘magnitude’ as the strong criterion (for an overview of 
results, see section 5). First, regarding signage, for each possible replacement 
we pose the question whether MS provide (dis)incentives with the same sign as 
in the reference case of full auctioning. If so, then they comply with the criterion; 
if not, then they fail, meaning that these MS provide perverse replacement in-
centives. Second, regarding magnitude,  we ask how high the replacement Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  7 
(dis)incentives provided by MS are, and how that compares to the reference 
case value. Clearly, if the (dis)incentive figures are the same as those of the 
reference case of full auctioning (i.e. the difference of CRepl (MS) - CRepl (Ref) = 0), 
then MS provide the correct (dis)incentives. If not, for each emission saving re-
placement (see green area in Figure 2), MS either provide too many (Δ>0) or 
too few (Δ<0) incentives, or even perverse incentives (CRepl (MS)<0, Δ<<0). When 
looking at each emission increasing replacement (see red area in Figure 2), MS 
either do not sufficiently discourage such replacements (Δ>0) or do so too 
strongly (Δ<0), or may provide perverse incentives (CRepl (MS)>0, Δ>>0). In addi-
tion to these two replacement criteria, we also assess whether the relative 
magnitude of replacement incentives for the three new power plant options for a 
given reference plant reflects the carbon efficiency order of these plants. This is 
the case if the incentive order corresponds to that of the reference case, be-
cause there should be greater incentives for a replacement resulting in higher 
emission savings than for one resulting in lower emission savings or even in-
creased emissions  
It is important to note that only the incentives provided by the EU ETS are 
2.4  Differences in power generation structure and renewal 
In order to be able to relate the findings on the cross-country comparison of al-
                                           
evaluated here5. Country-specific legislation which could strengthen or weaken 
the EU ETS’ incentives is not taken into account, nor are any other factors, such 
as fuel prices or their availability. The analysis conducted here aims to scruti-
nize the impact of allocation rules and including other factors would only con-
fuse the issue. This is also the reason why we do not provide figures on the 
monetary incentives of the EU ETS and how they relate to investment costs. 
needs 
location rules to country differences in the power generation structure, we pro-
vide some key figures describing electricity production across the EU MS. 
Figure 3 shows the amounts of electricity generated by the combustion of gas, 
hard coal, lignite and the most important other fuel sources in each country.  
 
5   Existing transfer rules in a few MS, which allow a transfer of allowances from existing to 
new installations under a set of very specific conditions, were not included in the analysis. 
These were excluded because information in the NAPs tends to be vague and evidence 
from Germany suggests these rules are only applied to a very limited extent.  8  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 


























































Source: Eurostat (2008) 
Obviously gas, coal and lignite account for a large part of pan-European gross 
electricity production (about 48% in 2006) and play a crucial role in almost every 
country. Since the generation mix varies strongly across MS, the importance of 
the allocation rules within countries may be expected to vary accordingly. 
In addition, we present the foreseeable amount of new investments because 
allocation rules may matter most in countries with an urgent need to invest in 
new power generation capacities. Figure 4 shows the planned investment ca-
pacities for the power sector across Europe. These are largest in Germany, 
Spain, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands (64% of overall planned capacities).  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  9 

















































Source: Platts (2008) 
 
 
3  Classification of allocation rules and application in 
the power sector in 2008-12 
3.1  Classification of allocation rules 
In emission trading schemes, allowances can either be allocated free of charge or 
sold or auctioned to the regulated entities (Tietenberg, 1985). In the first two 
phases of the EU ETS, a minimum share of 95% (2005-12) and 90% (2008-12), 
of the EUAs had to be allocated free of charge, so that all the MS had to decide 
how to allocate their gratis allowances. In principle, gratis allocation can be based 
on emissions, output or capacity. In the case of emission-based allocation, it can 
refer to either historical or projected emission values, thus providing the allocation 
basis. In contrast, output-based allocation determines the distribution of allowances 
by using specific emission values per unit of production (e. g. t CO2/GWh). These 
emission values can either be installation-specific or benchmarks for a larger group 
of plants (fuel- or technology-differentiated or uniform), which are then multiplied by 
an output level to yield the allocation basis. The output level can be calculated by 
applying past or predicted installation-specific or standardized activity rates. In the 10  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
case of capacity-based allocation, the installed plant capacity itself can be used as 
a reference value (i.e. t CO2/GW). Regardless of the allocation rules, the calcu-
lated allocation basis may then be multiplied by different factors (e.g. compliance 
or growth factors, as well as an auctioning share) to adjust the sum of allow-
ances allocated to all installations to the specified emission cap. 
Auctioning is the only allocation mechanism without distortions (e. g. Cramton and 
Kerr, 2002). Having to buy allowances for new plants provides strong monetary 
incentives to implement low-carbon technologies, since these require the purchase 
of fewer allowances. Auctioning is also the simplest and most transparent alloca-
tion method and thus to be preferred from an economic perspective. In contrast, 
any form of gratis allocation may encourage over-production, because gratis allow-
ances amount to a subsidization of production, both of existing and new plants 
(Spulber, 1985, Ellermann, 2008). Output-based allocation using uniform bench-
marks and uniform production rates is considered second-best (Ahman and Holm-
gren, 2006, Ahman et al., 2007, Cremer and Schleich, 2006). Such uniform 
benchmarks provide – independent of their level – strong incentives to invest in the 
most carbon-efficient technology within the benchmark group. However, any differ-
entiation, e. g. by fuels, reduces the cost-saving potential of the trading scheme 
because incentives for carbon efficiency are then only assured within the group 
(Gagelmann, 2006). The innovation incentives for new plants are lowest when 
allowances are allocated according to installation-specific emission values or 
based on emissions. Also, since allocating allowances to existing installations 
based on benchmarks tends to result in fewer allowances than under emission-
based or installation-specific allocation of existing plants, benchmarking typically 
provides greater incentives to substitute old carbon-intensive plants with more car-
bon efficient new plants. 
In order to guarantee the correct functioning of the trading system as a whole, 
the evaluation of the allocation rules depends not only on the characteristics of 
each of the rules, but also on the balance they strike between existing plants, 
new entrants and the replacement of plants (Matthes et al., 2005, Sterner and 
Muller, 2006). Regarding the replacement of plants, it is important to note that 
within the EU ETS, shutting down a plant results in a subsequent termination of 
allocation which amounts to an output subsidy (Spulber, 1985, Ahman et al., 
2007). The distorting effects of these closure rules in combination with the treat-
ment of new entrants have been analyzed by Ellermann (2008) and others. It is 
because of the closure rules that the number of free allowances allocated to new 
entrants have to be balanced against those allocated to existing plants when ana-Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  11 
lyzing replacement incentives. Since new plants are generally more efficient, they 
should not be disadvantaged when compared to existing installations (Gagelmann, 
2006) because generous allocation to existing installations and not to new entrants 
holds the danger of prolonging the lifetime of less efficient plants (“mothballing”). 
One way to deal with the inefficiencies generated by the termination of allocation 
after closure is a transfer rule, according to which the gratis allocation of a closing 
plant can be transferred to a new one. Summing up, in general, the goal should be 
an equal treatment of existing and new installations, e. g. by allocation through 
auctioning or output-based uniform benchmarks.  
3.2  Overview of EU ETS phase 2 (2008-12) allocation rules 
for the power sector 
Table 2 provides a qualitative overview of the relevant allocation rules applied in 
EU MS to conventional power plants. It also includes the overall auctioning 
share. Regarding existing installations, a remarkably high share of EU MS 
bases their allocation on historical ‘emissions’. ‘Uniform benchmarks’6, which 
would be favourable from an economic point of view (see section 2), are applied 
in fewer countries. A ‘differentiated benchmark’ is the most common rule ap-
plied in MS with high emissions. Only Slovakia is considering ‘specific emission 
values’ for existing installations. The allocation rules change with regard to new 
plants: The majority of MS use benchmarking (mostly differentiated) here, often 
combined with standard load factors. There is a noticeable decrease in the ap-
plication of emission-based allocation. Plant-specific allocation, which was al-
ready rare for existing plants, is negligible for new ones. 
                                            
6   In spite of the fact that the benchmark is uniform, variations in standard load factors or 
adjustment factors can occur. However, because only the benchmark is considered in this 
classification, countries with a uniform benchmark but, e. g. fuel-differentiated load factors, 
are still included in this group even though the resulting allocation is fuel-specific. 12  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 



















Share of total 
cap
AT Hist Proj 1,3% 1
BE_BR Hist Proj 1
BE_FL SLF SLF 1
BE_WA SLF SLF 1
BG Hist Proj 1
CZ Hist Proj 2
DE Hist SLF 8,9% 1
DK Hist SLF 0,3% 1
EE Hist Proj 1
ES SLF SLF 2
FI Hist SLF 1
FR Hist Proj 2
GR Hist SLF 2
HU** 5,0% 3
IE Hist SLF 0,5% 1
IT Hist SLF 1
LT Hist SLF 2,8% 2
LU Hist SLF 1
LV Hist Proj 1
NL Hist Proj 4,0% 1
PL Hist Proj 1,0% 2
PT Hist SLF SLF 2
RO Hist SLF 2
SE 1
SI Hist Proj 2
SK Hist Proj 1
UK SLF SLF 7,0% 1
* The reference values are marked by different indexes: 
Hist: Historical; Proj: Projection; SLF: Standard load factor
** Since the large uncertainty with regard to the allocation rules in Hungary could not be clarified before completion of the study, this 
country is excluded from the analysis in the following sections. 
*** The status of certainty of the allocation rules presented in this study is indicated (1 for sure, 3 for unsure).
Allocation basis*
Existing plants New plants
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
 
In Table 3, we cluster EU MS according to their allocation method for existing 
and new installations. In order to do so, we combine both “emission-based allo-
cation” and “specific emission value” into a more general category of “installa-
tion-specific allocation”, and keep “differentiated benchmark” and “individual 
benchmark” as the second and third broad categories. As can be seen, the ma-
jority of NAPs fall into the cluster of differentiated benchmarks for both existing 
and new installations (8), followed by the combination of individual allocation for 
existing and differentiated benchmark for new installations (7). Table 3 also 
highlights that only 3 NAPs apply uniform benchmarks to new installations and 
to existing installations as well, even though such uniform benchmarking is con-
sidered the second-best approach after auctioning.  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  13 
















BG, FR, GR, LV, 
PL, PT, RO  (7)
BE_FL, BE_WA, 





IE, LU, SI (3) LT, UK (2) AT, DK, SE (3) 8 23%
Σ 14 10 3 26 97%






34% 59% 8% 100%
Rules for existing plants
* Sum not equal to 100% because of exclusion of MS without clear allocation rules (HU, MT, CY); 
appearance of PT in two groups for existing plants (individual allocation to coal and a benchmark based 
allocation to gas); value for Belgium  allocated to Flanders and Wallonia because of the regional 





















Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a)  
 
 
4  Results: Incentives for the replacement of plants 
4.1  Replacement incentives for lignite power plants 
The existing lignite plant has by far the highest specific emissions of the set of 
reference plants. Consequently, every replacement implies emission savings, 
meaning that any replacement should be encouraged, as illustrated by the posi-
tive values for the auctioning reference case. In comparison, the replacement 
(dis)incentives arising from MS’ allocation rules are presented in Figure 5 and 
Table 4.
7  
                                            
7   The replacement criterion for lignite was applied to 13 MS, as only these MS use lignite as 
a combustible (Eurostat, 2008). In the following we assume that new coal and gas power 
plants can be built in every MS, whereas a new lignite plant can only be built where lignite 
combustion already exists. However, in some MS (AT, ES, IE, SI, SK, FI), the total share of 
lignite-based electricity production is very low. 14  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 











































*  The dotted patterns indicate perverse replacement (dis)incentives. 
Source: calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
 
Replaced by a new lignite plant: Replacing the existing lignite-fired power plant 
with a new lignite plant leads to a reduction in the specific emissions of 
139 t CO2/GWh (-13%), but the new lignite plant still emits 904 t/GWh. In gen-
eral, MS disincentivize this lignite-lignite replacement, which is underlined by 
the fact that only 3 out of 13 MS provide a replacement incentive and are thus in 
line with the auctioning reference. There is a large spread from -589 EUA/GWh 
to 267 EUA/GWh (range of 856 EUA/GWh), with the standard deviation of 200 
EUA/GWh further highlighting the high variation among MS. However, this large 
range is mainly caused by Germany – the only MS to offer a strong replacement 
incentive for lignite-lignite, about twice as high as in the reference case. 
Replaced by a new coal plant: Replacing the existing lignite plant with a new 
coal one leads to an emissions saving of 338 t CO2/GWh (-32%). Replacement 
incentives vary widely across MS, highlighted by the range from -390 EUA/GWh 
to 774 EUA/GWh and a high standard deviation (270 EUA/GWh). As 7 out of 13 MS 
provide a replacement incentive, whereas 5 MS provide a disincentive, it is diffi-
cult to determine a general tendency. However, significant lignite-coal replace-
ment incentives only exist in Germany, Spain and Finland, with Spain’s incen-Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  15 
tive matching the one of the auctioning reference case, while the German incen-
tive tops this by factor 2.  
Replaced by a new gas plant: Replacing the existing lignite plant with a new gas 
plant saves 707 t CO2/GWh (-68%). However, the results show that only 6 out 
of 13 MS provide a lignite-gas replacement incentive. Of these 6, 5 offer a sig-
nificant incentive when compared to the auctioning reference (Austria, Ger-
many, Spain, Finland and Ireland). Again, the replacement incentive is by far 
the strongest in Germany, but even here it remains slightly below the auctioning 
reference. The disincentives in 6 MS are relatively small, leading to a range 
from -68 EUA/GWh to +668 EUA/GWh. This large spread of 735 EUA/GWh and 
the high standard deviation of 251 EUA/GWh illustrate the differences across 
the MS. 
Table 4:  Replacement incentives for existing lignite plant 
 
Incentive Disincentive
AT -165 10 34 6 403 3 2 1 X 9
BG 1 3 17 7 -6 62 1 X
CZ -13 6 -13 9 -13 90 3 X
DE 267 1 774 1 668 1 3 0
EE -68 8 -68 11 -68 13 0 3 X
ES -37 73 3 822 9 34 2 1 X
FI -11 52 4 135 5 42 2 1 X 9
GR -270 12 -71 12 -51 12 0 3 X 9
IE -148 91 0 742 2 35 2 1 X 9
PL 31 2 47 5 24 8 3 0
RO -221 11 -22 10 -25 11 0 3 X
SI -589 13 -390 13 -21 10 0 3 X 9
S K 040807 0 0
Auctioning 139 338 707 3 0 9
NL NC NG
MS with replacement incentive 3 7 6
MS with replacement disincentive 956
Statistical values in EUA/GWh
Average -94 76 152
Standard deviation 200 270 251
Range 856 1,164 735
Minimum -589 -390 -68 Legend
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Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
Summary: of the 13 MS analyzed, 7 MS provide at least one replacement in-
centive, but only Austria, Germany, Spain, Finland and Ireland reach significant 
levels which are comparable to the auctioning reference. In contrast, 10 MS 
provide perverse incentives against the replacement of old lignite plants. Also, 
the incentive order in terms of carbon efficiency is fulfilled by only 5 MS (Austria, 16  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
Finland, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia). Finally, Germany represents an outlier 
because in all three replacement situations it provides the largest incentives by 
far, which in the cases of lignite and hard coal go well beyond the level indi-
cated by the auctioning reference.  
4.2  Replacement incentives for hard coal power plants 
From an environmental point of view, replacing an existing coal plant with a new 
lignite plant is harmful as it leads to an increase of specific emissions. There-
fore, replacement incentives should only be provided for new hard coal and new 
gas plants, which is fully reflected by the auctioning reference case. Figure 6 
and Table 5 show that replacement (dis)incentives vary significantly across the 
analyzed 20 MS8. 












































*  The dotted patterns indicate perverse replacement (dis)incentives. 
Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
                                            
8   These are represented by 21 NAPs because for Belgium we had to consider two of the tree 
regional NAPs (Flanders and Wallonia), while Brussels was excluded due to the lack of an 
existing coal plant. Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  17 
Replaced by a new lignite plant: Replacing an existing coal plant by a new lig-
nite one leads to a 12% increase in specific emissions (+98 t CO2/GWh). There-
fore, supporting replacement corresponds to setting perverse incentives, which 
is the case for 3 of 13 MS (Germany, Poland and Bulgaria), albeit only at a low 
level. In contrast, the majority of MS are in line with the premise of carbon effi-
ciency, even exhibiting disincentives of a magnitude well beyond the auctioning 
reference. Finally, replacement incentives vary from -589  EUA/GWh to 36 
EUA/GWh (range of 625 EUA/GWh). 
Table 5:  Replacement incentives for existing coal plant 
 
Incentive Disincentive
AT -253 4 -54 18 315 7 1 2 X 9
BE_FL NA 101 7 829 2 2 0 9
BE_WA NA 101 7 978 1 2 0 9
BG 8 10 24 13 1 16 3 0 X
CZ -10 8 -10 14 -10 18 0 3 X
DE 36 12 542 1 436 4 3 0 X
DK NA -24 15 378 5 1 1 X 9
ES -275 2 101 7 56 13 2 1
FI -230 7 23 11 336 6 2 1 9
FR NA 267 3 51 14 2 0
GR -262 3 -63 19 -43 21 0 3 X 9
I E - 2 2 3 53 24 1 4 8 9 2 1 9
IT NA 358 2 196 10 2 0
NL NA 150 5 186 11 2 0 9
PL 31 13 47 17 24 15 3 0 X
PT NA 156 6 139 12 2 0
RO -214 6 -15 16 -18 19 0 3 X
S E N A 1 0 174 7 03 2 0 9
SI -589 1 -390 21 -21 20 0 3 X 9
S K 0 9 01 201 70 0
UK NA -189 20 221 8 1 1 X 9
Auctioning -98 101 470 2 1 9
NL NC NG
MS with replacement incentive 3 13 16
MS with replacement disincentive 8 74
Statistical values in EUA/GWh
Average -165 60 222
Standard deviation 186 188 278
Range 625 932 1,021
Minimum -589 -390 -43 Legend


















Gas (NG) Coal (NC)
Source:   Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
Replaced by a new coal plant: The majority of NAPs (13 out of 21) incentivize 
the replacement of an old by a new coal-fired power plants, which is associated 
with a reduction in CO2 emissions of 101  t  CO2/GWh (or -13%). Yet, at the 18  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
same time, the large spread from -390 EUA/GWh to 542 EUA/GWh (range of 
932 EUA/GWh; standard deviation of 188 EUA/GWh) reflects the significant 
differences among MS. Our analysis also shows that, in 5 MS, the incentives 
are well above the auctioning reference (Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, and Portugal). At the same time, in 7 MS, disincentives for such a CO2 
emission reducing replacement exist, particularly in the UK and Slovenia. 
Replaced by a new gas plant: Replacing the existing hard coal plant with a gas-
fired plant leads to a large decrease in specific emissions (-470 t CO2/GWh or 
-58%), which is reflected by the high incentive level in the auctioning reference 
case. In line with this, the majority of MS (16 of 21 NAPs) provide replacement 
incentives, some even well beyond the reference level (Belgium, regions Flan-
ders and Wallonia). Our results vary between -43 to 978 EUA/GWh (standard 
deviation of 279 EUA/GWh), which illustrates not only the large differences 
across MS, but also that a few MS actually provide disincentives for such a CO2 
emission reducing replacement (e. g. Greece).  
Summary: All 21 NAPs incentivize at least one replacement leading to emission 
reductions9. However, 10 NAPs (i.e. almost half of them) provide perverse re-
placement incentives, yet 11 NAPs are in line with the carbon efficiency order 
suggested by the reference case.  
4.3  Replacement incentives for gas power plants 
In the case of replacing an existing gas plant, every replacement other than a 
gas-gas replacement causes an increase in specific emissions. Therefore, ac-
cording to the replacement criterion, allocation rules should not incentivize a 
replacement by coal or lignite plants. The results of our analysis of the alloca-
tion rules in 24 MS10 are presented and compared to the reference case of full 
auctioning in Figure 7 and Table 6. 
Replaced by new lignite plant: Replacing an existing gas with a new lignite plant 
would generate an enormous emission increase of 544  t  CO2/GWh (+151%) 
which is why the reference case exhibits a disincentive in the same magnitude. 
Correspondingly, 10 out of 13 NAPs provide disincentives for this replacement, 
                                            
9   Strictly speaking, in Slovakia there are neither incentives nor disincentives. 
10   These are represented by 26 NAPs because for Belgium we had to consider all three re-
gional NAPs (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia).  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  19 
but 2 MS provide slight perverse incentives (Bulgaria and Poland). Again, the 
large spread of 620 EUA/GWh (-589 EUA/GWh to +31 EUA/GWh) and the 
standard deviation of 229 EUA/GWh illustrate the differences in allocation rules 
across MS. 
Replaced by a new coal plant: If the existing gas plant were replaced by a new 
hard coal plant, this would lead to an increase in specific emissions by 
345 t CO2/GWh (+96%). The resulting reference disincentive of -345 EUA/GWh 
is contrasted with a range of disincentives as large as -1,099 EUA/GWh up to a 
perverse incentive of +398 EUA/GWh (highest range of 1,497 EUA/GWh). 7 out 
of 26 NAPs provide perverse incentives for such a replacement (by far the larg-
est in Germany, France and Italy), while 17 NAPs comply with the criterion by 
providing disincentives (in Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia) as well as Denmark 
even well beyond the auctioning reference). 












































*  The dotted patterns indicate perverse replacement incentives 
Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
Replaced by a new gas plant: As the specific emissions of a new gas plant are 
24 t/GWh (-7%) below the emissions of the existing gas plant, there should be 
incentives to replace the older plant. The range of +329 to -221 EUA/GWh un-
derlines the variation among the MS and illustrates that not all MS incentivize 20  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
this replacement: While 16 out of 26 NAPs provide replacement incentives, in 
some instances also much higher than in the reference case (Germany, Lux-
embourg, Lithuania, Italy), 8 NAPs provide disincentives for such a replacement 
(particularly large ones in Belgium-Wallonia, Portugal and Denmark). 
Table 6:  Replacement incentives for existing gas plant 
 
Incentive Disincentive
AT -531 2 -332 7 37 9 1 2 X 9
BE_BR NA 0 17 0 17 0 0
BE_FL NA -704 2 24 12 1 1 X 9
BE_WA NA -1,099 1 -221 26 0 2 X 9
BG 21 12 37 20 14 15 3 0
CZ -5 10 -5 15 -5 19 0 3 X
DE -108 8 398 26 292 2 2 1 X
DK NA -470 3 -68 24 0 2 X 9
EE -23 9 -23 13 -23 22 0 3 X
ES -306 5 69 22 24 12 2 1 X
FI -536 3 -283 8 29 6 1 2 X 9
FR NA 255 24 39 8 2 0
GR -247 6 -48 12 -28 23 0 3 X 9
I E - 3 6 4 4 - 1 0 9 2 3 851 2 X 9
IT NA 282 25 120 4 2 0
LT NA -183 9 255 3 1 1 X 9
LU NA -106 10 329 1 1 1 X 9
LV NA -6 14 6 16 1 1 X 9
NL NA 20 19 57 7 2 0 9
PL 31 13 47 21 24 11 3 0
PT NA -91 11 -107 25 0 2 X
RO -200 7 -1 16 -5 20 0 3 X
S E N A - 3 4 5 62 4 1 21 1 X 9
SI -589 1 -390 4 -21 21 0 3 X 9
S K 01 101 701 70 0
UK NA -385 5 25 10 1 1 X 9
Auctioning -544 -345 24 1 2 9
NL NC NG
MS with replacement incentive 27 16
MS with replacement disincentive 10 17 8
Statistical values in EUA/GWh
Average -220 -134 32
Standard deviation 229 313 114
Range 620 1,497 550
Minimum -589 -1,099 -221 Legend
Maximum 31 398 329 Perverse incentive
Number Number















Source:   Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
Summary: 16 out of 26 NAPs incentivize the only carbon-efficiency improving 
replacement of the existing gas plant with a new gas plant. However, at the 
same time, 19 NAPs provide perverse replacement incentives in one way or Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  21 
another11. Yet in 14 NAPs, the allocation rules lead to the same incentive order 
for the three replacement options as in the reference case. 
 
5  Discussion and conclusion 
This section summarizes and discusses the results of our analysis of the incen-
tives provided by the EU ETS allocation rules (2008-12) in EU MS to replace an 
existing reference plant with a new plant. In Table 7, countries whose allocation 
rules lead to replacement incentives with the same sign as the ones in the auc-
tioning reference case fulfil the weak replacement criterion (indicated by a green 
shaded “9”). If MS (dis)incentives are not in line with the reference case, then 
they fail this criterion because their allocation rules provide perverse incentives 
(indicated by a red “x”).12  
The analysis shows that, in approx. 60% of the possible replacement situations, 
MS set incentives according to the reference case of 100% auctioning, whereas 
in approx. 32% of the possible replacements, MS provide perverse incentives. 
Only 5 MS do not provide any perverse incentives (Belgium (Flanders), Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Latvia and Sweden).13 In contrast, 5 MS provide perverse 
incentives in more than half of the possible replacement options (Czech Repub-
lic, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). 
                                            
11   In Slovakia and Belgium (Brussels Region), there are neither incentives nor disincentives. 
12   Consequently, whether MS provide replacement incentives or disincentives can be derived 
from a comparison of the criterion fulfilment and the value of the reference case. For ex-
ample, if, in the reference case, replacement is discouraged (indicated by a “-”), and the 
MS fails the criterion (“x”, i.e. perverse incentive), then this means that the MS provides a 
replacement incentive which would lead to an increase in specific emissions. 
13   Within the replacement options for one type of existing reference plant, 4 additional MS are 
in full “sign” alignment with the auctioning reference (Germany and Poland for existing lig-
nite, Spain for existing coal, and Austria for existing gas. These are all MS which allocate 




































































Table 7:  Compatibility of sign of replacement incentives with reference 
 













 EL  EC G
l
9 9 9
AT X 99 21 9 X 9 21 999 3072
BE_BR 00 00 OO 0000
BE_FL 00 99 20 99 2040
BE_WA 00 99 20 9 X 1131
BG 99 X 21 X 99 21 XX9 1254
CZ XX X 03 9 XX 12 99X 2136
DE 99 9 30 X 99 21 9 X 9 2172
DK 00 X 9 11 9 X 1122
EE XX X 03 00 99X 2124
ES X 99 21 999 30 9 X 9 2172
FI X 99 21 999 30 999 3081
FR 00 99 20 X 9 1131
GR XX X 03 9 XX 12 99X 2136
IE X 99 21 999 30 999 3081
IT 00 99 20 X 9 1131
LT 00 00 99 2020
LU 00 00 99 2020
LV 00 00 99 2020
NL 00 99 20 X 9 1131
PL 99 9 30 X 99 21 XX9 1263
PT 00 99 20 9 X 1131
RO XX X 03 9 XX 12 99X 2136
SE 00 99 20 99 2040
SI XX X 03 9 XX 12 99X 2136
SK OO O 00 OOO 00 OOO 0000
UK 00 X 9 11 99 2031
Au ing + + + 30 -++ 30 --+ 3090
No. 3 of 13 (23%) 7 of 13 (54%) 6 of 13 (46%) 8 of 12 (67%) 13 of 21 (62%) 16 of 21 (76%) 10 of 13 (77%) 17 of 26 (65%) 16 of 26 (62%)






Replacement (dis)incentives in accordance with reference case (auctioning)
Replacement (dis)incentives not in accordance with reference case (auctioning)
O Neither incentive nor disincentive provided
+ In the auctioning reference case a positive replacement incentive is provided
- In the auctioning reference case a replacement disincentive is provided
Replaced by NG
Country
16 of 39 (41%) 37 of 54 (69%) 43 of 65 (66%)
14 of 54 (26%) 17 of 65 (26%)
Coal (EC)G a s G)
Re acement (dis)incentives in accordance with aucti ing reference case
Sum
Lignite (EL)
Sum Replaced by 
NL Replaced by NC Replaced by NL
51 of 158 (32%)
20 of 39 (51%)
Sum E
Tota
Replaced by NC Replaced by NG Replaced by NL
96 of 158 (61%)
Replaced by 
NC Replaced by NG
Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  23 
However, just looking at the right sign is a relatively weak replacement criterion 
because it does not provide any information about the magnitude of the re-
placement (dis)incentives, which could be either well below or above the auc-
tioning reference. Therefore, Table 8 shows the – often strong – deviation of the 
MS’ values from the (dis)incentive provided in the reference case of full auction-
ing (as indicated in the last row).14 For each MS and replacement option, a 
value of zero (“0”) indicates perfect alignment with the auctioning reference. 
However, only 4 MS and 7% of all replacement cases comply with this replace-
ment criterion for at least one replacement option (Belgium (Flanders, Wal-
lonia), Spain, Poland, and Sweden). Of these, only Sweden consistently sets 
the same (dis)incentives as in the reference case, which is due to the fact that 
no gratis allowances are provided. In 32% of replacement cases, MS provide 
perverse incentives (white figures with red shading). 54% of the remaining black 
figures fulfil the weak replacement criterion, but the magnitude of the 
(dis)incentives deviates from the reference case15. Of these, approx. 36% are 
too weak (black figures on light green shading) while 20% over-incentivize re-
placements (black figures on dark green shading). For example, in the case of 
existing lignite, Germany provides replacement incentives well above the level 
foreseen by the auctioning reference for replacements by coal or lignite, and 
incentives below the reference for replacement with new gas, thereby incentiviz-
ing sub-optimal replacement decisions.  
                                            
14   See section 2 for criteria explanation. 
15   In 7% of the replacement cases, neither incentives nor disincentives are provided (yellow 
shaded cells). 24  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
Table 8:  Compatibility of magnitude of replacement incentives with reference 
 
AT -304 -304 -304 -155 -155 -155 13 13 13
BE_BR 345 -24
BE_FL 0 359 -359 0 9
BE_WA 0 509 -754 -245 9
BG -138 -321 -713 106 -77 -469 565 382 -10
CZ -152 -351 -720 88 -111 -480 539 340 -29
DE 128 436 -39 134 441 -34 436 743 268
DK -125 -92 -125 -92
EE -207 -406 -775 521 322 -47
ES -176 0 -414 -176 0 -414 238 414 0 9
FI -151 -97 -153 -131 -78 -134 8 62 5
FR 166 -419 600 15
GR -409 -409 -758 -164 -164 -513 297 297 -52
IE -287 -232 -484 -125 -69 -322 180 236 -16




NL 49 -284 365 33
PL -108 -291 -683 129 -54 -446 575 392 0 9
PT 55 -330 254 -131
RO -360 -360 -732 -115 -115 -488 344 344 -29
SE 00 00 9
SI -728 -728 -728 -491 -491 -491 -45 -45 -45
SK -139 -338 -707 98 -101 -470 544 345 -24
UK -289 -249 -40 1
Auctioning 139 338 707 -98 101 470 -544 -345 24 9
Same Balance as reference case
Tendency of (dis)incentive correct but too strong
Tendency of (dis)incentive correct but too weak
Perverse incentive
Neither incentive nor disincentive provided




























Difference of replacement (dis)incentives provided by MS and those of the auctioning reference case
Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 
These variations across EU MS can only be explained to a limited extent by the 
type of allocation rule chosen by the MS (individual allocation, differentiated or 
uniform benchmark), as indicated by Figure 8. For example, the 5 MS in full 
compliance with the weak replacement criterion (sign) belong to 5 different allo-
cation clusters (BE_FL: Diff-Diff, LT: Diff-Uni, LU: Ind-Uni, LV: Ind-Diff, SE: Uni-
Uni (Auctioning)). Clearly, other factors – such as the specific benchmark val-
ues and whether these differ between existing and new plants, as well as cor-
rection factors – are more important than the type of allocation rule. In contrast, 
a clearer pattern emerges for MS with at least 5 perverse incentives, because 
existing installations are always allocated on the basis of individual allocation 
while new entrants either receive their allowances on the basis of individual al-
location or differentiated benchmarks (CZ: Ind-Ind, GR: Ind-Diff, RO: Ind-Diff, 





































































    
   
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ind ‐ Ind Ind ‐ Diff BM Ind ‐ Uni BM Diff BM ‐ Diff BM Diff BM ‐ Uni BM Uni BM ‐ Uni BM
Source: Calculations of Fraunhofer ISI based on its EU ETS database (Fraunhofer ISI, 2008a) 26  Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS 
When looking at all three existing plants and the corresponding replacement 
incentives provided for a particular fuel/technology (including perverse incen-
tives), then 2 MS stand out as particularly lignite-friendly (Germany and Po-
land). In the same vein, 7 MS provide very favourable incentives for replace-
ments with new coal plants (Germany, Bulgaria, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Poland). Finally, 3 MS particularly encourage replacement in-
vestments in new gas plants (Belgium (Flanders, Wallonia), Lithuania, and Lux-
embourg). We would therefore expect that in these MS adoption decisions are 
pushed towards plants with these fuels/technologies. However, these preferen-
tial treatments can only to a very limited extent be explained by the current gen-
eration mix of a MS (see Figure 3). 
Finally, in most instances, Germany stands out as the MS providing the largest 
replacement incentives, often followed by Italy and Spain – including incentives 
for replacement options which actually lead to higher specific emissions. These 
big investment subsidies16 may to some extent be explained by Germany’s 
large replacement needs (see Figure 4), although other MS with similarly large 
planned new capacities still tend to be in much better compliance with the auc-
tioning reference case (e. g. UK).  
Three cautious remarks are in order: first, the results presented in this study 
clearly depend on the assumptions specified for the set of reference power 
plants and on the uniform emission factors of fuels. That is, no country-specific 
modifications are made regarding the set of reference power plants or emission 
factors (see section 2.2). However, it is precisely these simplifying assumptions 
which help to see through the complexities and variations of the EU ETS alloca-
tion rules to the (dis)incentives these rules provide. Second, while a great effort 
was made to collect up-to-date allocation rules of EU MS, uncertainty remains 
regarding the rules of the NAPs (see section 2.1). Third, in interpreting the find-
ings, it needs to be considered that the impact of differences in free allocation 
depends on expected EUA prices and that the resulting incentives are just one 
element in the complex investment decision process of power generators, and 
not necessarily the most important one (see Cames, 2008). In addition, since 
the gratis allocation for the power sector will be phased out in 2013 (EU, 2008), 
the replacement (dis)incentives resulting from today’s gratis allocation rules are 
                                            
16   These replacement incentives would have been amplified even more if the Commission 
had not ruled against the 14-year rule which guaranteed the same level of gratis allocation 
for 14 years after commissioning (EU, 2006). Cross-country comparison of replacement incentives of the EU ETS  27 
unlikely to have an impact on ongoing investment appraisals. Therefore, the 
potential harm resulting from the multitude of perverse incentives is likely to be 
limited. As a consequence of these caveats, it is not possible to use our analy-
sis to predict actual investment behaviour. Rather, our findings underline the 
tremendous variation of replacement incentives among EU MS due to the MS-
specific EU ETS allocation rules and the high share of perverse incentives that 
have been created through allocating allowances free of charge.  
We conclude that the replacement incentives resulting from the allocation rules 
in the EU ETS in its second phase (2008-12) vary substantially across MS. 
More importantly, the share of perverse incentives generated due to gratis allo-
cation reaches a strikingly high level of 32 per cent of replacement options. The 
findings of our study support the introduction of full auctioning for the power 
sector starting in 2013 (EU, 2008) as this will abolish any distorting replacement 
incentives. In addition, auctioning is the only solution which does not create dis-
torting incentives between new investments in fossil-fuel-fired plants and re-
newables. Our findings reiterate the recommendations of earlier studies that the 
trading schemes emerging in the rest of the world, such as in the US, should 
refrain from gratis allocation in the power sector. If this is not politically palat-
able, we suggest that policymakers strive for a high share of auctioning 
(Burtraw et al., 2005) and predetermine a – rather short – period for allocating 
free allowances. Together, these moves would limit the harmful impact of the 
distorting replacement incentives likely to arise from politically bargained gratis 
allocation rules.  
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Annex: Country Codes 
AT Austria 
BE_BR Brussels  (Belgium) 
BE_FL Flanders  (Belgium) 
BE_WA Wallonia  (Belgium) 
BG Bulgaria 
CY Cyprus 
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